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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 17-1996 
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
      
v. 
  
JULIUS GREER 
a/k/a 
“POONY” 
 
Julius Greer, 
                Appellant 
     ________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 2-10-cr-00711-01) 
District Judge: Honorable John R. Padova 
 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 5, 2018 
 
Before: MCKEE, AMBRO, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 16, 2018) 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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McKEE, Circuit Judge 
Julius Greer appeals from the sentence that was imposed following the Supreme 
Court’s remand of his appeal from his original conviction for Hobbs Act robbery based 
on the Court’s subsequent decision in Alleyne v. United States.1 For the reasons that 
follow, we will affirm the district court’s rejection of the arguments Greer made 
following that remand. 
I.2  
 Greer raises two issues in this appeal. First, he asserts that the district court erred 
in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment for a purported Speedy Trial Act 
violation. Second, he claims that his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) must be vacated 
because Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence under that statute.  
A. Speedy Trial Act  
 
The Speedy Trial Act requires that a defendant be tried within seventy days of his 
indictment, information, or arraignment, whichever is later.3 After seventy days have 
elapsed, a defendant may move to dismiss the charges against him and the indictment 
“shall be dismissed.”4 When ruling on a motion to dismiss an indictment for purported 
Speedy Trial Act violations, the district court must identify and tally the days included on 
                                              
1 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013). The Court granted Greer’s petition for certiorari after we 
affirmed his conviction on direct appeal.  See United States v. Greer, 645 Fed. Appx. 205 
(3d Cir. 2016). 
2 The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction 
over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. 
3 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). 
4 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). 
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the speedy trial clock and count toward the seventy-day limit.5 The district court may, 
however, exclude certain days from this calculation, including delays that resulted from 
the pretrial motions and court continuances.6  
The parties agree that this appeal centers on the district court’s exclusion of the 
thirty-three days that elapsed from May 25, 2011 to June 27, 2011.7  The district court 
ostensibly excluded that time after granting the government’s April 28th motion for a 
continuance.8 However, the government sought that continuance because the assigned 
prosecutor was scheduled to begin another trial on May 9th—the same day Greer’s trial 
was to begin.9  That scheduling conflict was presumably resolved by the time the court 
granted the government’s request on May 24th.  Accordingly, the court erred in granting 
the government’s continuance request based on a nonexistent scheduling conflict. 
 However, Greer’s counsel did not object to that continuance. Instead, after the 
court scheduled trial for June 27, 2011, he indicated his consent by stating: “that’s 
fine.”10 Additionally, Greer did not specifically challenge the district court’s decision to 
exclude this time period from its Speedy Trial Act calculation when he moved to dismiss 
the indictment.11 When, as here, a defendant fails to object to an alleged error, that error 
                                              
5 Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 507, 126 S.Ct. 1976, 164 L.Ed.2d 749 (2006).   
6 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D) & (7)(A). 
7 Br. for Appellant, 34–37; Br. for Appellee, 16. 
8 Specifically, in granting the order the District Court wrote that “the failure to grant this 
continuance would result in a miscarriage of justice, and would unreasonably deny the 
government continuity of counsel and the reasonable time necessary for effective 
preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence[.]” App. 119. 
9 App. 59–60.  
10 App. 115. 
11 App. 122–23.  
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is considered “forfeited” and we may review for plain error.12 Accordingly, we may 
reverse only if, inter alia, “the error ‘seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings.”13 Greer contends that he satisfied this standard 
because the violation was both “blatant and egregious.”14 We disagree. 
 There is nothing in the record to suggest that the district court’s erroneous decision 
to grant the government’s moot continuance request affected the outcome of this case. 
Greer does not allege, for example, that he was unable to present evidence or locate 
witnesses as a result of the delay.15  In fact, he does not proffer anything to suggest that 
the delay seriously affected the judicial proceedings. We therefore decline to find plain 
error and affirm the denial of his motion to dismiss. 
B. Hobbs Act Robbery and § 924 Convictions 
 
Greer also contends that his conviction under § 924(c)(3)(B) must be vacated 
because Hobbs Act robbery is not a “crime of violence.” He advances three arguments in 
support of this point. First, he claims that his Hobbs Act conviction cannot be considered 
a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(B)’s residual clause because that clause is void for 
vagueness.16 Next, he claims that the substantive offense of Hobbs Act robbery does not 
                                              
12 U.S. v. Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d 189, 203 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting U.S. v. Dobson, 419 
F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 2005)).  
13 Id. 
14 Br. for Appellant, 37. 
15 See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972) (“If witnesses die or disappear during a 
delay, the prejudice is obvious. There is also prejudice if defense witnesses are unable to 
recall accurately events of the distant past.”); United States v. Young, 657 F.3d 408, 420 
(6th Cir. 2011) (discussing witness unavailability an alleged spoliation of mitigation 
evidence as a result of a Speedy Trial violation).  
16 Br. for Appellant, 41. 
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qualify as a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A) because it does not require the “use, 
attempted use, or threatened use of violent physical force.”17 Finally, he asserts that 
conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a crime of violence under § 
924(c)(3)(A) for the same reason.  
  However, we have already held that Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a predicate 
crime of violence under § 924(c)’s elements clause when a defendant is 
contemporaneously convicted of both crimes.18 Greer was convicted of Hobbs Act 
robbery and carrying or using a firearm during the commission of that robbery, and it is 
therefore clear that the jury found that Greer’s robbery “sprang from the barrel” of a 
gun.19 Thus, it qualifies as a crime of violence. Accordingly, we will affirm Greer’s 
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and need not address Greer’s other two grounds for 
challenging his Hobbs Act conviction.20 
II.  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.  
                                              
17 Id. at 41. 
18 United States v. Robinson, 844 F.3d 137, 139 (3d Cir. 2016); United States v. Galati, 
844 F.3d 152, 154–55 (3d Cir. 2016). 
19 Robinson, 844 F.3d at 144. 
20 See Robinson, 844 F.3d at 141 (holding that we need not address a challenge to the § 
924(c)’s residual clause when it is clear that Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence 
under the elements clause). 
